WASHINGTON, DC- In a speech today before the Asia Society in Washington, U.S. Senator Bob Casey (D-PA), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reflected on his recent trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan and outlined his thoughts on restructuring U.S. policy toward Pakistan. Following his remarks, Senator Casey took questions from the audience. The full text of his remarks is included.
“The United States has one overriding national security priority when it comes to South Asia: ensuring that Al Qaeda or any other terrorist group does not gain the sanctuary needed to plot, plan and train for another terrorist attack against the American homeland or our allies,” said Senator Casey. “Today, that objective is in serious jeopardy. Despite some 62,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan, including approximately 34,000 American forces and more than 140,000 Afghan troops and police, Taliban and Al Qaeda forces have regrouped and become stronger over the past two years.”
Senator Casey also outlined his thoughts on transforming the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. He proposed five key recommendations:
· First, we need a real counterinsurgency strategy to shut down the terrorist safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
· Second, it is time to take a serious look at conditioning U.S. military assistance to Pakistan on the enforcement of pledges to stamp out cross-border flows of militants, weapons and other illicit trade.
· Third, we need stronger oversight to ensure the proper use of the billions of dollars we spend on assistance to Pakistan in its efforts to combat terrorism in the FATA.
· Fourth, we must broaden and diversify U.S. assistance to Pakistan beyond a pure military focus.
· Finally, we must reassure the Pakistani people that the United States is serious when it pledges a long-term commitment to Pakistan.
RETHINKING THE U.S.-PAKISTAN PARTNERSHIP
Speech before the Asia Society
By Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
July 9, 2008
Good morning. I want to thank Jack Garrity for that kind introduction. I am honored to join you here today at the Asia Society. The work of the Asia Society is tremendously valuable to us here in Washington, especially those of us serving in the Congress.
I want to thank the Asia Society for inviting me to discuss this morning the key foreign policy challenges the United States faces in South Asia, particularly in Pakistan. Over the recent Memorial Day congressional recess period, I had the opportunity to travel to the region – to Islamabad and Karachi in Pakistan, to Kabul in Afghanistan, and to New Delhi and Hyderabad in India. In Islamabad and Kabul, I had the great pleasure of being joined by the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Carl Levin.
This was my first ever trip to South Asia -- and I witnessed first hand the incredible diversity of Pakistan. My time in Islamabad was focused on the security and political challenges facing this key nation, but the day I spent in Karachi allowed me to see another side of Pakistan. Whether by discussing the national economy with the head of Pakistan’s central bank, who also happens to be a woman, or hearing from the dynamic mayor of Karachi on his ambitious plans to modernize the city and its municipal services, it became clear to me that the Pakistani people yearn for a government that reflects their talents and aspirations. Pakistan enjoys a broad middle class and a commitment to liberal democratic values; it is a natural partner for the United States.
Ladies and gentlemen, the United States has one overriding national security priority when it comes to South Asia: ensuring that Al Qaeda or any other terrorist group does not gain the sanctuary needed to plot, plan, and train for another terrorist attack against the American homeland or our allies.
Today, that objective is in serious jeopardy. Despite some 62,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan, including approximately 34,000 American forces, and more than 140,000 Afghan troops and police, Taliban and Al Qaeda forces have regrouped and become stronger over the past two years. Finding sanctuary in the southern and eastern parts of the country and along the border with Pakistan, Taliban and pro-Al Qaeda forces are threatening to undermine hard-fought international efforts to bring stability and peace to Afghanistan.
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently called the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan the “site of planning for the next attack” on the United States, a conclusion echoed in recent findings of our intelligence community. All the evidence indicates that Osama bin Laden and other senior Al Qaeda leaders are hiding somewhere in the lawless border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Cross-border infiltrations by militants from Pakistan into Afghanistan increased by 50% in May alone. A new Pentagon report predicts violence in Afghanistan will continue to rise this year as “the Taliban [have] regrouped after its fall from power and…coalesced into a resilient insurgency.” According to this report, the greatest challenge to long-term security in Afghanistan lies in the insurgent sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal regions, adjacent to the 1,500 mile long border with Afghanistan.
In July 2007, the Intelligence Community reported that Al Qaeda has “protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including a safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership.” A subsequent assessment issued this year states that Al Qaeda is now using the FATA region to put into place the last elements necessary to launch another attack on the United States.
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, we vowed to never again allow Al Qaeda or any other extremist group to acquire sanctuary to plot against the United States. When the 9/11 Commission report was released three years later, depicting the missed opportunities and strategic blunders that led to that terrible day, we declared that never again would our government stand by and permit America’s sworn enemies to take shelter to plot evil.
Yet, this is precisely what is happening today.
Despite more than six years and $10 billion of investment in Pakistan to fight the central battle in the war on terror, we are losing the counterinsurgency battle on the Afghan-Pakistani border. We have yet to convince Pakistan that this war against extremists and militants is fundamentally in its own self-interest and not just ours.
This became clear to me during my time in the region. Afghan officials with whom we met, from President Karzai on down, strongly believe that Pakistan provides significant support to the Taliban and seeks to destabilize the Afghan government. They voiced their concern that the Pakistani Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), both of which remain outside effective civilian control, don’t mind looking the other way when Taliban militants move back and forth across the border.
In Pakistan, leader after leader, including President Musharraf, Army Chief of Staff General Kayani, Prime Minister Gilani, and Pakistan People’s Party leader Zardari conveyed their personal pledges to crack down on foreign fighters and militant forces in the border region. They insisted that any agreement with tribal leaders will include provisions to eject foreign fighters and end cross-border flows. I was pleased by the recent statement from Prime Minister Gilani’s office renewing the pledge of the civilian government to do all it can to prevent attacks on Afghanistan from Pakistan. But if previous pledges by the Pakistani government to crack down on militants are any guide, we have little cause for optimism.
To take but one example, on the day Chairman Levin and I arrived in Kabul, there was a firefight on the Afghan-Pakistani border. Senior U.S. military officials told us that Pakistani forces sent ambulances to retrieve wounded Taliban or Al Qaeda affiliated fighters and bring them back to Pakistan. Pledges by Pakistan to enforce prohibitions on cross-border flows are difficult to believe when we hear these types of reports.
It is important to note that the Pakistani army has already lost more than 1,400 paramilitary and other soldiers since its first offensive against the Taliban in 2004. Pakistan does not hear often enough that America appreciates the sacrifices it has made in the war on terror. In my meetings with Pakistani leaders, I tried to convey that note of gratitude. We will only move forward on addressing the serious national security challenges we face in Pakistan by refashioning our bilateral ties into a genuine partnership.
So it is time to rethink the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. It is time for a drastic change of course.
First, we need a real counterinsurgency strategy to shut down the terrorist safe haven in the FATA. The Administration’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the 9/11 Commission, and congressional legislation have all called for such a strategy countless times in the past. It’s time to act.
The recent parliamentary election in Pakistan provides a rare opportunity to chart a new and effective course in our bilateral counterterrorism partnership. A majority of the Pakistani people believe the United States is only interested in bolstering President Musharraf to the detriment of Pakistani democracy and civil society. We now have a chance to forge a new relationship with Pakistan, one that invests in institutions instead of individuals.
A new counterinsurgency strategy would recognize that Pakistan is an important ally and that we should help them in this fight however we can. But it would also verify that the Pakistanis are making a focused effort to crack down on cross-border flows and rooting out extremist sanctuaries. For far too long, the Administration has been willing to take promises from Pakistan’s leadership at face value. For example, while there is nothing wrong with Pakistani government leaders negotiating with the FATA’s tribal elders who know the border region the best, we must have an ironclad commitment from Pakistan’s leadership that provisions prohibiting cross-border flows be enforced.
Second, it is time to take a serious look at conditioning U.S. military assistance to Pakistan on the enforcement of pledges to stamp out cross-border flows of militants, weapons, and other illicit trade.
Congress was recently notified by the Administration of its intention to use $74.5 million for a Security Development Plan to train and equip the Pakistani Frontier Corps to conduct counterinsurgency activities within the FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province and to stop cross-border incursions into Afghanistan.
Yet General Dan McNeill, who until recently commanded NATO’s International Security Assistance Force, recently declined to endorse U.S. plans to train and equip the Frontier Corps, questioning the effectiveness and loyalty of the tribally recruited guards.
Accordingly, Senator Levin and I have called for any funding for the Frontier Corps to be conditioned on an explicit commitment by the Pakistanis to stop cross-border incursions. I support effective U.S. assistance, but it must be accompanied by accountability.
Third, we need stronger oversight to ensure the proper use of the billions of dollars we spend on assistance to Pakistan in its efforts to combat terrorism in the FATA. Since 9/11, nearly 90% of U.S. assistance to Pakistan has gone to the military – unaccounted for other than in broad and ill-defined categories.
From 2001 to 2007, the United States reimbursed Pakistan approximately $5.6 billion in Coalition Support Funds (CSF) for military operations in the FATA and other related expenditures. CSF reimbursements are issued directly to the Pakistani treasury. As a former Auditor General in the state of Pennsylvania, and an American taxpayer, I find this process unacceptable.
The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad has implemented recent steps to strengthen oversight procedures, and I strongly encourage them to continue to do so to retain the confidence of the Congress. We may also wish to explore tying these reimbursements to the fulfillment of strategic objectives or specific results, rather than continuing a blank check approach.
Fourth, we must broaden and diversify U.S. assistance to Pakistan beyond a pure military focus. The United States has invested embarrassingly little in the areas where the fundamental struggle against extremism must take place: education, democracy building (including the rule of law), and accountable governance. The statistics in Pakistan are staggering:
There are 70 million illiterate people in Pakistan;
Only 50% of children are in school;
45% of the population is under the age of 25; and
Pakistan has the highest child and maternal mortality rates in the world.
These numbers represent a tremendous setback for U.S. policy; they signal that a military approach alone without sustained development assistance will not work. They also signal that the new civilian government in Islamabad must make a strong commitment to improving the lives of the average Pakistani, rather than be needlessly diverted by political battles. I want to salute the leadership demonstrated by Senators Biden and Lugar, who have offered a promising blueprint to expand and diversify U.S. assistance to Pakistan, including tripling non-military assistance to Pakistan over a ten year period.
Finally, we must reassure the Pakistani people that the United States is serious when it pledges a long-term commitment to Pakistan. For too long now, our obsession with short term imperatives in Pakistan has sowed confusion over our real motivations and objectives. Let me be clear: the United States has abandoned Pakistan in the past when Pakistan no longer suited our needs. That cannot happen again. We cannot expect Pakistan to forge a new partnership with the United States if they are unable to trust our intentions.
I am told that the symbol of the Asia Society is a leogryph. These beasts that are half lion and half griffon have stood guard alongside Buddhist temples throughout Asia, protecting against the intrusion of evil forces. The leogryph’s mission embodies what we seek to accomplish in this battle against extremism.
Thank you for your time today. I would be pleased to take any questions you may have.
###
“The United States has one overriding national security priority when it comes to South Asia: ensuring that Al Qaeda or any other terrorist group does not gain the sanctuary needed to plot, plan and train for another terrorist attack against the American homeland or our allies,” said Senator Casey. “Today, that objective is in serious jeopardy. Despite some 62,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan, including approximately 34,000 American forces and more than 140,000 Afghan troops and police, Taliban and Al Qaeda forces have regrouped and become stronger over the past two years.”
Senator Casey also outlined his thoughts on transforming the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. He proposed five key recommendations:
· First, we need a real counterinsurgency strategy to shut down the terrorist safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
· Second, it is time to take a serious look at conditioning U.S. military assistance to Pakistan on the enforcement of pledges to stamp out cross-border flows of militants, weapons and other illicit trade.
· Third, we need stronger oversight to ensure the proper use of the billions of dollars we spend on assistance to Pakistan in its efforts to combat terrorism in the FATA.
· Fourth, we must broaden and diversify U.S. assistance to Pakistan beyond a pure military focus.
· Finally, we must reassure the Pakistani people that the United States is serious when it pledges a long-term commitment to Pakistan.
RETHINKING THE U.S.-PAKISTAN PARTNERSHIP
Speech before the Asia Society
By Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
July 9, 2008
Good morning. I want to thank Jack Garrity for that kind introduction. I am honored to join you here today at the Asia Society. The work of the Asia Society is tremendously valuable to us here in Washington, especially those of us serving in the Congress.
I want to thank the Asia Society for inviting me to discuss this morning the key foreign policy challenges the United States faces in South Asia, particularly in Pakistan. Over the recent Memorial Day congressional recess period, I had the opportunity to travel to the region – to Islamabad and Karachi in Pakistan, to Kabul in Afghanistan, and to New Delhi and Hyderabad in India. In Islamabad and Kabul, I had the great pleasure of being joined by the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Carl Levin.
This was my first ever trip to South Asia -- and I witnessed first hand the incredible diversity of Pakistan. My time in Islamabad was focused on the security and political challenges facing this key nation, but the day I spent in Karachi allowed me to see another side of Pakistan. Whether by discussing the national economy with the head of Pakistan’s central bank, who also happens to be a woman, or hearing from the dynamic mayor of Karachi on his ambitious plans to modernize the city and its municipal services, it became clear to me that the Pakistani people yearn for a government that reflects their talents and aspirations. Pakistan enjoys a broad middle class and a commitment to liberal democratic values; it is a natural partner for the United States.
Ladies and gentlemen, the United States has one overriding national security priority when it comes to South Asia: ensuring that Al Qaeda or any other terrorist group does not gain the sanctuary needed to plot, plan, and train for another terrorist attack against the American homeland or our allies.
Today, that objective is in serious jeopardy. Despite some 62,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan, including approximately 34,000 American forces, and more than 140,000 Afghan troops and police, Taliban and Al Qaeda forces have regrouped and become stronger over the past two years. Finding sanctuary in the southern and eastern parts of the country and along the border with Pakistan, Taliban and pro-Al Qaeda forces are threatening to undermine hard-fought international efforts to bring stability and peace to Afghanistan.
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently called the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan the “site of planning for the next attack” on the United States, a conclusion echoed in recent findings of our intelligence community. All the evidence indicates that Osama bin Laden and other senior Al Qaeda leaders are hiding somewhere in the lawless border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Cross-border infiltrations by militants from Pakistan into Afghanistan increased by 50% in May alone. A new Pentagon report predicts violence in Afghanistan will continue to rise this year as “the Taliban [have] regrouped after its fall from power and…coalesced into a resilient insurgency.” According to this report, the greatest challenge to long-term security in Afghanistan lies in the insurgent sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal regions, adjacent to the 1,500 mile long border with Afghanistan.
In July 2007, the Intelligence Community reported that Al Qaeda has “protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including a safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership.” A subsequent assessment issued this year states that Al Qaeda is now using the FATA region to put into place the last elements necessary to launch another attack on the United States.
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, we vowed to never again allow Al Qaeda or any other extremist group to acquire sanctuary to plot against the United States. When the 9/11 Commission report was released three years later, depicting the missed opportunities and strategic blunders that led to that terrible day, we declared that never again would our government stand by and permit America’s sworn enemies to take shelter to plot evil.
Yet, this is precisely what is happening today.
Despite more than six years and $10 billion of investment in Pakistan to fight the central battle in the war on terror, we are losing the counterinsurgency battle on the Afghan-Pakistani border. We have yet to convince Pakistan that this war against extremists and militants is fundamentally in its own self-interest and not just ours.
This became clear to me during my time in the region. Afghan officials with whom we met, from President Karzai on down, strongly believe that Pakistan provides significant support to the Taliban and seeks to destabilize the Afghan government. They voiced their concern that the Pakistani Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), both of which remain outside effective civilian control, don’t mind looking the other way when Taliban militants move back and forth across the border.
In Pakistan, leader after leader, including President Musharraf, Army Chief of Staff General Kayani, Prime Minister Gilani, and Pakistan People’s Party leader Zardari conveyed their personal pledges to crack down on foreign fighters and militant forces in the border region. They insisted that any agreement with tribal leaders will include provisions to eject foreign fighters and end cross-border flows. I was pleased by the recent statement from Prime Minister Gilani’s office renewing the pledge of the civilian government to do all it can to prevent attacks on Afghanistan from Pakistan. But if previous pledges by the Pakistani government to crack down on militants are any guide, we have little cause for optimism.
To take but one example, on the day Chairman Levin and I arrived in Kabul, there was a firefight on the Afghan-Pakistani border. Senior U.S. military officials told us that Pakistani forces sent ambulances to retrieve wounded Taliban or Al Qaeda affiliated fighters and bring them back to Pakistan. Pledges by Pakistan to enforce prohibitions on cross-border flows are difficult to believe when we hear these types of reports.
It is important to note that the Pakistani army has already lost more than 1,400 paramilitary and other soldiers since its first offensive against the Taliban in 2004. Pakistan does not hear often enough that America appreciates the sacrifices it has made in the war on terror. In my meetings with Pakistani leaders, I tried to convey that note of gratitude. We will only move forward on addressing the serious national security challenges we face in Pakistan by refashioning our bilateral ties into a genuine partnership.
So it is time to rethink the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. It is time for a drastic change of course.
First, we need a real counterinsurgency strategy to shut down the terrorist safe haven in the FATA. The Administration’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the 9/11 Commission, and congressional legislation have all called for such a strategy countless times in the past. It’s time to act.
The recent parliamentary election in Pakistan provides a rare opportunity to chart a new and effective course in our bilateral counterterrorism partnership. A majority of the Pakistani people believe the United States is only interested in bolstering President Musharraf to the detriment of Pakistani democracy and civil society. We now have a chance to forge a new relationship with Pakistan, one that invests in institutions instead of individuals.
A new counterinsurgency strategy would recognize that Pakistan is an important ally and that we should help them in this fight however we can. But it would also verify that the Pakistanis are making a focused effort to crack down on cross-border flows and rooting out extremist sanctuaries. For far too long, the Administration has been willing to take promises from Pakistan’s leadership at face value. For example, while there is nothing wrong with Pakistani government leaders negotiating with the FATA’s tribal elders who know the border region the best, we must have an ironclad commitment from Pakistan’s leadership that provisions prohibiting cross-border flows be enforced.
Second, it is time to take a serious look at conditioning U.S. military assistance to Pakistan on the enforcement of pledges to stamp out cross-border flows of militants, weapons, and other illicit trade.
Congress was recently notified by the Administration of its intention to use $74.5 million for a Security Development Plan to train and equip the Pakistani Frontier Corps to conduct counterinsurgency activities within the FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province and to stop cross-border incursions into Afghanistan.
Yet General Dan McNeill, who until recently commanded NATO’s International Security Assistance Force, recently declined to endorse U.S. plans to train and equip the Frontier Corps, questioning the effectiveness and loyalty of the tribally recruited guards.
Accordingly, Senator Levin and I have called for any funding for the Frontier Corps to be conditioned on an explicit commitment by the Pakistanis to stop cross-border incursions. I support effective U.S. assistance, but it must be accompanied by accountability.
Third, we need stronger oversight to ensure the proper use of the billions of dollars we spend on assistance to Pakistan in its efforts to combat terrorism in the FATA. Since 9/11, nearly 90% of U.S. assistance to Pakistan has gone to the military – unaccounted for other than in broad and ill-defined categories.
From 2001 to 2007, the United States reimbursed Pakistan approximately $5.6 billion in Coalition Support Funds (CSF) for military operations in the FATA and other related expenditures. CSF reimbursements are issued directly to the Pakistani treasury. As a former Auditor General in the state of Pennsylvania, and an American taxpayer, I find this process unacceptable.
The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad has implemented recent steps to strengthen oversight procedures, and I strongly encourage them to continue to do so to retain the confidence of the Congress. We may also wish to explore tying these reimbursements to the fulfillment of strategic objectives or specific results, rather than continuing a blank check approach.
Fourth, we must broaden and diversify U.S. assistance to Pakistan beyond a pure military focus. The United States has invested embarrassingly little in the areas where the fundamental struggle against extremism must take place: education, democracy building (including the rule of law), and accountable governance. The statistics in Pakistan are staggering:
There are 70 million illiterate people in Pakistan;
Only 50% of children are in school;
45% of the population is under the age of 25; and
Pakistan has the highest child and maternal mortality rates in the world.
These numbers represent a tremendous setback for U.S. policy; they signal that a military approach alone without sustained development assistance will not work. They also signal that the new civilian government in Islamabad must make a strong commitment to improving the lives of the average Pakistani, rather than be needlessly diverted by political battles. I want to salute the leadership demonstrated by Senators Biden and Lugar, who have offered a promising blueprint to expand and diversify U.S. assistance to Pakistan, including tripling non-military assistance to Pakistan over a ten year period.
Finally, we must reassure the Pakistani people that the United States is serious when it pledges a long-term commitment to Pakistan. For too long now, our obsession with short term imperatives in Pakistan has sowed confusion over our real motivations and objectives. Let me be clear: the United States has abandoned Pakistan in the past when Pakistan no longer suited our needs. That cannot happen again. We cannot expect Pakistan to forge a new partnership with the United States if they are unable to trust our intentions.
I am told that the symbol of the Asia Society is a leogryph. These beasts that are half lion and half griffon have stood guard alongside Buddhist temples throughout Asia, protecting against the intrusion of evil forces. The leogryph’s mission embodies what we seek to accomplish in this battle against extremism.
Thank you for your time today. I would be pleased to take any questions you may have.
###
