Sends letter to Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates over GAO report detailing lack of preparedness of the Afghan Security Forces
WASHINGTON, DC– U.S. Senator Bob Casey (D-PA) today sent a letter to Secretary Condoleezza Rice and Secretary Robert Gates asking them about the lack of preparedness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as described in a report released by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on June 18th, 2008. Senator Casey, who recently returned from Afghanistan, today spoke on the Senate floor to voice his concerns over the resurgence of Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan.
“Despite investing approximately $16.5 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police forces over the past six years, I am alarmed to learn that the United States still lacks a comprehensive interagency plan to build the Afghan army and police,” said Senator Casey. “More troubling is the fact that only two of 105 army units and zero police units are considered fully capable of conducting their primary mission.”
Specifically, Senator Casey asked Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates:
1) The costs for maintaining the security forces are estimated at approximately $2 billion per year. Given the Afghan government’s limited financial capacity, are these costs sustainable or will the international community be supporting the Afghan army and police for the foreseeable future?
2) Why is the United States’ timeline for completion of a fully capable Afghan police force (2012) different from the benchmark used by the Afghan government and the international community (2010)?
3) How are we effectively evaluating the capability of the army and the police? How are the Defense Department’s “capability milestones” being evaluated? Too often, we are overly concerned with quantitative indices (i.e. number of troops, weapons, uniforms, etc.) rather than taking a qualitative approach. The United Nations Police (UNPOL) has begun developing a Rule of Law Index (ROLIX) to help qualitatively measure the progress of security sector institutions in their work to establish the rule of law that may be of great value here.
4) The importance of civilian mentors in building the Afghan security forces cannot be overstated. As the GAO has stated, international peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor have shown that field-based training of local police by international police mentors is critical to the success of establishing professional police forces. Why is there still such a shortage of police mentors? How will this be remedied?
5) Equipment shortages plague both the Afghan army and police. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) officials have stated that equipment shortages are due to competing U.S. priorities in Iraq. Why are the Afghan security forces facing such massive equipment shortages? Why is this not a major priority for the U.S. government?
Senator Casey today also voiced his concerns over the resurgence of Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan during a speech on the Senate floor. Senator Casey stressed his belief in the importance of training Afghan security forces.
During his speech, Senator Casey urged the Bush Administration to refocus efforts and “concentrate on the real front in the war on terror.” “It’s time to get serious about winning in Afghanistan,” Casey said.
Earlier this month, Senator Casey joined Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, on a trip to Afghanistan. On their trip, Senators Casey and Levin met with President Karzai, senior U.S. civilian and military officials, NATO military officials and with U.S. troops.
Full text of the letter is below:
Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates:
I read with great concern the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) June 2008 report on the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Despite investing approximately $16.5 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police forces over the past six years, I am alarmed to learn that the United States still lacks a comprehensive interagency plan to build the Afghan army and police. More troubling is the fact that only two of 105 army units and zero police units are considered fully capable of conducting their primary mission. I am writing you today to ask a simple question: why are we so behind in this fundamental task?
Building sustainable peace requires having a national army and local police that can provide and maintain security once international forces leave. In the case of Afghanistan, this is especially crucial as terrorists could easily reestablish a safe haven. I recognize and appreciate that building capable and effective security forces is a difficult and complex undertaking, especially given the well-documented challenges we face in Afghanistan. However, this task must remain an urgent priority at the highest levels of this Administration. The security services, especially the local uniformed police, are the face of the Afghan Government and will determine the fate of security in Afghanistan.
I have several specific concerns regarding our efforts to build and sustain the Afghan National Security Forces.
• First, the costs for maintaining the security forces are estimated at approximately $2 billion per year. Given the Afghan government’s limited financial capacity, are these costs sustainable or will the international community be supporting the Afghan army and police for the foreseeable future?
• Why is the United States’ timeline for completion of a fully capable Afghan police force (2012) different from the benchmark used by the Afghan government and the international community (2010)?
• How are we effectively evaluating the capability of the army and the police? How are the Defense Department’s “capability milestones” being evaluated? Too often, we are overly concerned with quantitative indices (i.e. number of troops, weapons, uniforms, etc.) rather than taking a qualitative approach. The United Nations Police (UNPOL) has begun developing a Rule of Law Index (ROLIX) to help qualitatively measure the progress of security sector institutions in their work to establish the rule of law that may be of great value here.
• The importance of civilian mentors in building the Afghan security forces cannot be overstated. As the GAO has stated, international peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor have shown that field-based training of local police by international police mentors is critical to the success of establishing professional police forces. Why is there still such a shortage of police mentors? How will this be remedied?
• Equipment shortages plague both the Afghan army and police. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) officials have stated that equipment shortages are due to competing U.S. priorities in Iraq. Why are the Afghan security forces facing such massive equipment shortages? Why is this not a major priority for the U.S. government?
I look forward to reading your report to Congress on our efforts to assist the Government of Afghanistan in increasing the size and capability of the Afghan Security Forces, including assessments of key criteria for measuring the capabilities and readiness of the Afghan Security Forces. I cannot overemphasize how important it is that we get this right and not squander any further opportunities to help build these basic institutions in Afghanistan. The security of the Afghan and American people depends on it.
Sincerely,
Robert P. Casey
United States Senator
###
“Despite investing approximately $16.5 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police forces over the past six years, I am alarmed to learn that the United States still lacks a comprehensive interagency plan to build the Afghan army and police,” said Senator Casey. “More troubling is the fact that only two of 105 army units and zero police units are considered fully capable of conducting their primary mission.”
Specifically, Senator Casey asked Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates:
1) The costs for maintaining the security forces are estimated at approximately $2 billion per year. Given the Afghan government’s limited financial capacity, are these costs sustainable or will the international community be supporting the Afghan army and police for the foreseeable future?
2) Why is the United States’ timeline for completion of a fully capable Afghan police force (2012) different from the benchmark used by the Afghan government and the international community (2010)?
3) How are we effectively evaluating the capability of the army and the police? How are the Defense Department’s “capability milestones” being evaluated? Too often, we are overly concerned with quantitative indices (i.e. number of troops, weapons, uniforms, etc.) rather than taking a qualitative approach. The United Nations Police (UNPOL) has begun developing a Rule of Law Index (ROLIX) to help qualitatively measure the progress of security sector institutions in their work to establish the rule of law that may be of great value here.
4) The importance of civilian mentors in building the Afghan security forces cannot be overstated. As the GAO has stated, international peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor have shown that field-based training of local police by international police mentors is critical to the success of establishing professional police forces. Why is there still such a shortage of police mentors? How will this be remedied?
5) Equipment shortages plague both the Afghan army and police. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) officials have stated that equipment shortages are due to competing U.S. priorities in Iraq. Why are the Afghan security forces facing such massive equipment shortages? Why is this not a major priority for the U.S. government?
Senator Casey today also voiced his concerns over the resurgence of Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan during a speech on the Senate floor. Senator Casey stressed his belief in the importance of training Afghan security forces.
During his speech, Senator Casey urged the Bush Administration to refocus efforts and “concentrate on the real front in the war on terror.” “It’s time to get serious about winning in Afghanistan,” Casey said.
Earlier this month, Senator Casey joined Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, on a trip to Afghanistan. On their trip, Senators Casey and Levin met with President Karzai, senior U.S. civilian and military officials, NATO military officials and with U.S. troops.
Full text of the letter is below:
Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates:
I read with great concern the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) June 2008 report on the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Despite investing approximately $16.5 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police forces over the past six years, I am alarmed to learn that the United States still lacks a comprehensive interagency plan to build the Afghan army and police. More troubling is the fact that only two of 105 army units and zero police units are considered fully capable of conducting their primary mission. I am writing you today to ask a simple question: why are we so behind in this fundamental task?
Building sustainable peace requires having a national army and local police that can provide and maintain security once international forces leave. In the case of Afghanistan, this is especially crucial as terrorists could easily reestablish a safe haven. I recognize and appreciate that building capable and effective security forces is a difficult and complex undertaking, especially given the well-documented challenges we face in Afghanistan. However, this task must remain an urgent priority at the highest levels of this Administration. The security services, especially the local uniformed police, are the face of the Afghan Government and will determine the fate of security in Afghanistan.
I have several specific concerns regarding our efforts to build and sustain the Afghan National Security Forces.
• First, the costs for maintaining the security forces are estimated at approximately $2 billion per year. Given the Afghan government’s limited financial capacity, are these costs sustainable or will the international community be supporting the Afghan army and police for the foreseeable future?
• Why is the United States’ timeline for completion of a fully capable Afghan police force (2012) different from the benchmark used by the Afghan government and the international community (2010)?
• How are we effectively evaluating the capability of the army and the police? How are the Defense Department’s “capability milestones” being evaluated? Too often, we are overly concerned with quantitative indices (i.e. number of troops, weapons, uniforms, etc.) rather than taking a qualitative approach. The United Nations Police (UNPOL) has begun developing a Rule of Law Index (ROLIX) to help qualitatively measure the progress of security sector institutions in their work to establish the rule of law that may be of great value here.
• The importance of civilian mentors in building the Afghan security forces cannot be overstated. As the GAO has stated, international peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor have shown that field-based training of local police by international police mentors is critical to the success of establishing professional police forces. Why is there still such a shortage of police mentors? How will this be remedied?
• Equipment shortages plague both the Afghan army and police. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) officials have stated that equipment shortages are due to competing U.S. priorities in Iraq. Why are the Afghan security forces facing such massive equipment shortages? Why is this not a major priority for the U.S. government?
I look forward to reading your report to Congress on our efforts to assist the Government of Afghanistan in increasing the size and capability of the Afghan Security Forces, including assessments of key criteria for measuring the capabilities and readiness of the Afghan Security Forces. I cannot overemphasize how important it is that we get this right and not squander any further opportunities to help build these basic institutions in Afghanistan. The security of the Afghan and American people depends on it.
Sincerely,
Robert P. Casey
United States Senator
###
